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Appellant, Salt Lake County Board of Equalization respectfully submits the
following Brief in Reply pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RIO'S LEASE WITH
THE STATE CONSTITUTED THE USE OF PROPERTY WHICH IS A
CONCESSION IN, OR RELATIVE TO, THE USE OF THE MUSEUM
The Rio argues that the district court interpreted the term "concession" correctly,
and that it does not have to show that its "use" is "in, or relative to, the use" of the
museum. The Rio also argues that even under the Michigan construction of the statutory
language at issue in this case, the Rio qualifies for favorable tax treatment in the form of
an exemption. Finally, the Rio argues that the County failed to preserve for appeal its
argument that the Rio does not use its property "in, or relative to, the use o f a public
facility. This misrepresents the record. The County addresses these arguments below.
A. The district court failed to interpret the concession exemption statute
correctly because it did not strictly construe the statute or give effect and
meaning to all the words in the statute.
The Rio accuses the County of ignoring the term "concession" and the district
court's interpretation of the word, Rio Brief at 17; however, it is the district court and the
Rio, not the County, that have failed to strictly construe all the words in the statute. The
district court's interpretation fails to strictly construe the term "concession" and fails to
give meaning and relevance to the terms "in, or relative to," which terms were
presumably "chosen carefully and advisedly." Gull Laboratories, Inc. v. Auditing Div.,
1

936 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). When a taxpayer "claims the protection of an
exemption, the burden is upon him to demonstrate clearly and unequivocally that he falls
within the exemption; any reasonable doubt must be resolved against him." Eyring
Research Inst., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 598 P.2d 1348, 1350-51 (Utah 1979)(citation
omitted). Exemptions are construed strictly against the taxpayer. SF Phosphates Ltd. v.
Auditing Div., 972 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1998).
To meet its burden that it qualifies for the exemption, the Rio must show: (1) that
it uses its property as "a concession;" and (2) that such use of property as a concession is
"in, or relative to, the use" of a relevant public facility.1 Utah Code Ann. § 59-4101(3)(a) (1995). The Rio did not meet this burden before the district court.
The Rio has not met its burden of showing that its agreement is "a concession."
The definition cited by the Michigan Courts is more restrictive than the one cited by the
1

The Rio claims the County did not preserve this issue for appeal. The County addresses
this in Section 1(C) of this brief. However, the following exchange at oral argument
shows that the County preserved the issue for appeal:
Court: And if all the - all the State has to do to establish a concession is to give a grant,
then what more do I need to look at?
County:
That's a very fair question, your Honor.... [The County then makes an
argument based upon equity and fairness in the tax system] Another point, your Honor,
the—the statute requires more than just the concession agreement. It requires a
concession - 1 want to get the language perfectly - the use of property which is a
concession in or relative to the use of another public facility. And I think that's
where the specific obligations come in, the - why give a tax exemption here? Why
would the legislature want to make an exception for concessions? If you read the
Michigan cases, I think it's because the concession's coming in and doing something that
the State would otherwise have to do for a public purpose. In this case, there's nothing
in the agreement... which requires the Rio to provide a public service that's relative
to the - the museum. R. at 659, pp. 12-13. (emphasis added)

2

district court. The Michigan Courts define "concession" as "a privilege or space granted
or leased for a particular use within specific premises." City of Detroit v. Tygard, 161
N.W.2d 1, at 3 (Mich. 1968)(emphasis added) citing World Book Encyclopedia
Dictionary, p. 412. Another definition cited by the Michigan Courts is " c a space or
privilege within certain premises for a subsidiary business or service.'" Golf Concepts v.
City of Rochester Hills, 550 N.W.2d 803, 807 f.n. 3 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) citing
Random House Webster's College Dictionary 281, (1995).
Since the Rio is a self-contained for-profit business, not "within" the confines of,
or "subsidiary" to, the museum or the Amtrak leasehold, it is not a concession under the
more restrictive definitions. "The rule that [courts] must construe tax exemption statutes
against those seeking exemptions requires [courts] to adopt the more narrow definition
consistent with the statute's plain language as opposed to the broad, seemingly wide-open
definition proposed by the [Rio and the district court]." Gull Laboratories, 936 P.2d at
1085. (insert added) Hence if the space used by the Rio were located in the museum,
and the Rio's operations were subsidiary to the museum's operations (like the state-run

While the County conceded before the district court that one of the definitions of a
concession is as "a grant", the Court interrupted the County in mid-sentence and the
County did not finish its sentence. R. at 659, p. 11. Later in the argument, however, the
County argued to the district court at oral argument that "the notion of a concession is
that of a subsidiary business related to a public oriented operation." R. at 659, p. 14. The
County cited this definition from Michigan case law to support its argument. Seymour v.
Dalton Township, 442 N.W.2d 655, 657 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). The County also argued
that the limited definition cited by the Rio, of a "grant" "swallowed the privilege tax
rule." R. at 659, p. 15. The County also "disagree[d] with ... the statutory construction of
calling a concession a grant" and urged the Court to follow the specific obligation
requirements arising out of this more narrow definition as set forth in the Michigan cases.
R. at 659, p. 17-18.
^

museum bookstore), the Rio may qualify for the exemption. As a self-contained forprofit restaurant, however, the Rio does not qualify.
The Rio argues that the County's interpretation is "devoid of logic" and argues that
the County's interpretation precludes exemption for locker and restroom facilities at
sporting venues and would "require that the concession stands should be open any time
the gates are open - even during open practices or after the game is over." Rio Brief at
16-17. Notwithstanding the absurd suggestion that a governmental entity would hire a
private entity to run as a concession the locker and restroom facilities at a sports arena,
the County's interpretation does not require that concession stands be open during
practices or after games. A concession stand open to serve customers at a sporting event,
concert, or golf course, would qualify for the exemption because the services offered are
"incidental to and subsumed by a larger public purpose," unlike the Rio's self-contained
operation. Seymour v. Dalton Township, 442 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
The district court's construction, on the other hand, would extend the exemption to
restaurants, travel agencies, ski rental shops, grocery stores, or beauty parlors (or any
3

The Rio argues that the County's South Mountain Golf Course concessionaire hosts
events after hours when the golf course is not open. Unlike the Rio, which is open every
night separate and apart from any other public facility, the golf course concessionaire is
"in" the golf course clubhouse, and its use is subsumed by the public purposes
surrounding the golf course. The County attempted to use this, and other, concession
agreements as evidence before the State Tax Commission to demonstrate the specific
obligations inherent in a concession agreement. The Tax Commission, at the Rio's
bequest, did not find the agreements relevant and excluded the agreements as evidence.
Contrary to the Rio's assertion, the South Mountain agreement includes several specific
obligations to ensure that the concessionaire uses the County's property "relative to" the
County's golf course. Such provisions distinguish the South Mountain agreement from
the Rio's agreement with the State.

A

other "grants" or leaseholds available to the public) leasing exempt property physically
adjacent to a publicly owned sports arena or other exempt public facility, even if the lease
agreements creating such operations contained no provisions establishing a subsidiary, or
other, relationship between the "use" of the leased property and the "use" of the sports
arena, as required by the plain language of the statute.
The Rio has also failed to meet its burden that it uses its property "in, or relative
to, the use" of the museum. The undisputed facts show that the Rio's use is not "in" the
museum or Amtrak leasehold, nor is its "use" ... "relative to ... the use" of the museum.
The Rio attempts to deflect its burden onto the County by arguing that the Rio's burden
"must not be permitted to frustrate the exemption's objective." Corp. of Episcopal
Church v. State Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1996). Despite its charge, the
Rio fails to state what objective is being frustrated, or how the County's interpretation
would frustrate this unidentified objective.
The Court of Appeals of Michigan stated that one of the requirements of the
Michigan exemption, which Utah adopted "with alacrity," Gordon L. Roberts, The Utah
Tax on the Use of Tax Exempt Property, 9 Utah L. Rev. 415, 416 (1964), was that "the
venture should be a subsidiary business incidentally related to a public oriented
operation, rather than a privatized, self-contained operation." American Golf of Detroit
v. City of Huntington Woods, 570 N.W.2d 469, 471 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). The district
court's construction allows an exemption to private, self-contained operations like the
Rio simply because it is adjacent to a public facility, but denies the exemption to
similarly situated private restaurants leasing or owning private property, without any
5

policy justification. The exemption should only be allowed where the applying entity
proves beyond a "reasonable doubt" that it uses its property as a subsidiary business in, or
relative to, the use of a public oriented operation. Eyring Research Inst., Inc., 598 P.2d at
1350-51. See also The Utah Tax on the Use of Tax Exempt Property, 9 Utah L. Rev.
415, 418 (stating that "there does not appear to be any obvious reason why [concessions]
should not be taxed as other businesses are" (insert added)).
Treating similarly situated taxpayers differently violates the principles most
central to Utah's tax system, those of equality and uniformity, "the just and ultimate
purpose of the [tax] law." Rio Algom Co. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah
1984)(insertadded). In Interwest Aviation v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake
County4, the Utah Supreme Court stated that ".. .the established policy that allows [for
the privilege tax] is directly supported by the principle that there should be an equal
distribution of the tax burden among the entire tax base, absent overriding reasons to the
contrary." 743 P.2d 1222, 1225 (Utah 1987) (insert added)(citations omitted). The Rio
fails to identify "any overriding reasons" or policies supporting the district court's liberal
construction of the exemption statute, especially where a more strict construction of the
plain language of the statute is available.

4

In Interwest, a for-profit taxpayer sought the concession exemption on property it
owned, thereby making the business subject to ad valorem property taxes, and not
eligible for the exemption from privilege tax. The Interwest court did not define
"concession" and did not analyze whether the taxpayer used its property "in, or relative
to, the use" of another public facility, and is not of any analytical value to the
construction of the exemption statute subject to this case. 743 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1987).
fs

The Rio's reliance on State Dept. of Assessments and Taxation v. MarylandNational Capital Park and Planning Comm'n does not help its case. 702 A.2d 690 (Md.
1997). Unlike the Utah and Michigan statutes cited by the County, the Maryland statute
merely requires that the concession be located "in a public airport, park, or fairground."
The parties in National Capital Park stipulated that the concession was "in" the Park. 702
A.2d at 696. The parties in this action have not so stipulated, and in fact, it is undisputed
that the space leased by the Rio is not within the confines of the space used by the
museum or the Amtrak leasehold. R. at 3, ^ 13; R. at 188, Tf 13. The Maryland statute
does not require that the use of the concession be "in, or relative to, the use" of the public
facility, as the Utah and Michigan statutes require. The Maryland court also fails to cite
the more restrictive definition of the term "concession" and relied upon the less strict
definition supported by the district court. National Capital Park, 702 A.2d at 696-697.
The district court essentially rewrites the exemption statute, to read much like the
less restrictive Maryland statute, and allows an exemption for "the use of property, which
is a leasehold (not a concession) in public property (the Depot, not the museum or train
station), 'which contains5 a public airport, park, fairground or similar property (museum
and Amtrak leasehold), which is available as a matter of right to the use of the general
public." R. at 578, ^f 4. The district court removes the requirement that the Rio's "use of
the property" be "a concession in, or relative to, the use" of the museum and Amtrak
leasehold. That is not what the statute says, and the district court's decision should
therefore be reversed in favor of the County.

7

B. The Rio's lease with the State does not qualify for the exemption under the
Michigan definition of "concession" because it lacks the imposition of
obligations directed toward the fulfillment of a public purpose.
The Rio does not qualify for the concessionaire exemption as construed by the
Michigan courts. The Michigan Courts have defined 'concession' as " c a space or
privilege within certain premises for a subsidiary business or service.'" Golf Concepts,
550 N.W.2d at 807 f n. 3 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) citing Random House Webster's College
Dictionary, 281 (1995); R. 659, p. 14, lines 22-23. A concession invokes "the concept of
specific obligations on the part of the privileged party to maintain particular services at
specified times." Tygard, 161 N.W.2dat3.
Such obligations include (1) "the concept of exclusivity5," (2) "minimum hours
during which the services offered must be made available to the public," and (3)
"standards of service ... [which] must bear a reasonable relationship to the purposes o f
the public museum. Id. at 4. The Michigan Courts also look to (4) "oversight of fees
charged to the public" and (5) "oversight of operations." Seymour, 442 N.W.2d at 657.
These requirements must be "stated with specificity" and be "'directed toward the
fulfillment of a public purpose.'" Golf Concepts, 550 N.W.2d at 807 (Mich. Ct. App.
1996)(internal citation omitted).
The Rio's lease with the State is not that of "a subsidiary business or service" and
does not state any specific obligations directed toward the fulfillment of a public service.
5

The Rio correctly points out that later Michigan cases have done away with the
exclusivity requirement, but then misleadingly implies that it has exclusive right to serve
food at the Depot, when in fact the lease merely provides that it has exclusive use of the
space it is leasing. Rio Brief at 25, R. at 27-28. The lease expressly provides that the
State may contract for food services in other areas of the Depot. R. at 28.
8

(1) The Rio does not have exclusive use to offer food services at the Depot. R. at 28
("The State reserves the right to sell, dispense or contract for the sale of food and nonfood items in other areas of the [Depot]"). (2) The lease does not require minimum hours
during which the services must be offered to the general public. R. at 27-42. (3) The
lease lacks any specific standards of service, but merely provides that the Rio must hire
enough employees to provide "prompt, efficient service." R. at 32. (4) The lease does not
provide for any oversight of fees charged to the public. R. at 27-42. Finally, (5) the State
does not retain any oversight of operations over the manner in which the Rio operates its
business.
The Rio relies on extrinsic evidence, a recital to the contract, to support its
exemption claim. The recital provides that "the State is desirous of having a
restaurant/cafeteria operated at said location for the convenience of employees, visitors,
and general public of the State." R. at 27. The Rio claims that this recital invokes a
specific obligation upon the Rio. However, "recitals are only preliminary in nature and
will not, of themselves, be considered binding obligations on the parties or an effective
part of their agreement unless referred to in the operative portion of their agreement."
First Bank and Trust Co. v. Village of Orland Hills, 787 N.E.2d 300, 308 (111. Ct. App.
2003)(holding that trial court did not erroneously consider extrinsic evidence when it
looked in part to recital to interpret contract, where the trial court looked principally to
operative portion of agreement). Furthermore, the Rio argues that because the contract
does not provide a provision affirmatively requiring the Rio to pay the privilege tax, that
this distinguishes it from the Tygard case cited by the County. Rio Brief at 24-25. Since
9

it is in both the Rio's and the State's best interest that the Rio not pay the privilege tax, it
is not surprising that the parties left this out of the contract. The Rio fails to explain how
this absent provision amounts to a specific obligation relative to a public facility. Also,
the agreement between the State and the Rio does provide several provisions similar to
the contracts in the Michigan cases cited by the County and most leases. R. at 27-38.
These provisions do not refer to the museum or the Amtrak leasehold, except to clarify
that the State can contract or sell food items in the museum or Amtrak station, and to
divide up janitorial costs for the bathroom shared by the Rio and the museum. R. at 28,
36. These provisions are not "specific obligations" making the Rio's use subsidiary, or
"relative to," the use of the other facilities in the Depot.
The Rio's obligations are even less stringent than the obligations construed by the
Seymour court, which denied the exemption in that case. In that case, "minimum hours,
standards of service, or oversight of operations by the city are conspicuously absent.
Oversight of fees is not strenuous.... The maintenance requirement is consistent with the
[State's] interest in protecting its reversion after the termination of the agreement and
do[] not appear to be directed toward exacting some specific term or service for the
public benefit." Seymour, 442 N.W.2d at 657. The Rio's contract does not provide any
oversight of fees. At all relevant times, the Rio, like the taxpayer in Seymour, "had an
unacceptable degree of discretion to run [its restaurant] as [it] saw fit, without the
imposition of obligations directed toward the fulfillment of a public purpose." Id For
these reasons, the County requests that this Court reverse the district court's order and
grant summary judgment in favor of the County.
10

C. The Record shows that the County preserved its "in, or relative to"
argument for appeal.
The Rio claims that the parties failed to preserve for appeal the argument that the
Rio does not use its property as "a concession in, or relative to, the use o f the museum.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(3)(a)(1995). This is a misrepresentation of the record.
"To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must first raise the issue before the trial
court." Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). An
issue "is sufficiently raised if it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an
opportunity to rule on that issue." Id. (citation omitted). There are three requirements
that a party must satisfy to show that a party has afforded an opportunity to the district
court to rule on an issue.
First, the issue must be raised in a timely fashion.... Second, the
issue must be specifically raised ... such that the issue is sufficiently
raised to a 'level of consciousness5 before the trial court. Third, the
party must introduce to the trial court 'supporting evidence or
relevant legal authority' to support its argument.
Id. at 130. (internal citations omitted) The record shows that the parties preserved this
issue for appeal.
The County raised the issue of whether the Rio used its property as "a concession
in, or relative to, the use" of a relevant public facility: (1) before the Tax Commission, R.
at 21-22, App. A; (2) in its Petition for Review before the district court, R. at 4, ^f 18,
App. B; (3) in its Reply (as the Rio itself admits), R. at 449-450, and in its Response to
the Rio's Motion for Summary Judgment, including affidavits supporting its argument, R.
at 325-33, 359-362, 545-46, 578, App. C; and at length in its oral argument, R. at 659, p.

11

6, lines 12-15; p. 10, lines 11-19; p. 12 line 1 6 - p . 13, line 4; p. 15, lines 18-25. Ex.D.
Likewise, the Rio raised the issue in its Motion for Summary Judgment, R. at 259-260,
Ex. E. The district court also ruled on the issue, though incorrectly, when it concluded
that the Rio qualified for the exemption because it is "in" the Depot, R. at 578, ^f 4; R. at
659, p. 27, lines 15-18, App. F. The Rio's contention that neither party raised this issue
is curious when one considers that the Rio has the burden "to demonstrate clearly and
unequivocally that [it] falls within the exemption." Eyring Research Inst., Inc, 598 P.2d
at 1350-51 (Utah 1979)(citation omitted)(insert added). It cannot "fall[] within the
exemption" unless it proves it falls within the requirements of the statute.
The County (and the Rio) raised the issue before the district court, thereby timely
raising the issue; the County raised the issue in its pleadings and presented evidence and
legal authority, in its papers and at oral argument, showing that the Rio did not use its
property relative to the use of the museum, thereby raising the issue to the district court's
"level of consciousness"; and the County supported its claim with the same legal
authority (mainly the plain language of the statute and supporting case law) it relied upon
in its brief, and disagreed with the district court's suggestion that the district court should
only interpret the word "concession" in the exemption statute. R. at 659, p. 12, lines 1623. The district court took this information and incorrectly ruled that the Rio qualifies for
the exemption because it is located "in" the Depot. R. at 578.
Even //'the parties did not raise the issue, which they did, "'[a]n appellate court
has inherent authority to consider issues which the parties have not raised if doing so is
necessary to a proper decision.' (citation omitted) .... [A]n overlooked or abandoned
12

argument should not compel an erroneous result. [This Court] should not be forced to
ignore the law just because the parties have not raised or pursued obvious arguments."
Kaiserman Assoc. Inc. v. Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1999)(addressing issue
that garnishment is not a pleading raised before trial court but not adequately briefed
before supreme court). The Rio would have this Court ignore the obvious requirement of
the statute that it must use its property "in, or relative to, the use" of the museum or
Amtrak station to merit the advantages of the exemption.
Also, even if the parties did fail to raise this issue, which they did not, it would
have been plain error for the court to find that the Rio qualified for the exemption where
the district court failed to find that the Rio met all the requirements of the statute. The
plain error exception requires the County to show that: (1) an error exists, (2) the error
should have been obvious to the district court, and (3) the error is harmful. Hart, 945
P.2datl31,fn. 3.
In this case, had the district court not erroneously found that the Rio's existence
"in" or "at" the Depot was sufficient to qualify for the exemption, it would have been an
error for the district court to grant the exemption where the Rio had the burden to prove
its "use" was "in, or relative to, the use" of the museum or Amtrak leasehold. Such error
should have been obvious to the district court because section 101(3)(a) clearly requires
that the exemption may only be granted for "the use of property which is a concession in,
or relative to, the use" of a relevant public facility. Such error would have been harmful
to the County and the other taxpayers who must pay the Rio's tax burden because it

would allow the Rio to receive tax treatment without presenting evidence that it clearly
meets all the requirements of the exemption.
The Rio also complains that the County did not identify lease provisions or other
facts6 in the record to support its argument before the district court. Rio Brief at 13-14.
The Rio does not present any legal authority to support the relevance of this complaint.
The Rio's complaint is not unlike a claim made by an insurance company in Progressive
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Dalgleish, 2002 UT 59, ^ 14, 52 P.3d 1142, 1146. In Dalgleish, an
insured injured in an automobile accident failed to specifically identify to the district
court a determinative lease provision relevant to the insured's claim against the insurance
company. The Utah Supreme Court noted in a footnote that:
We note that there is no indication in the record that the parties
brought this particular provision to the district court's attention.
However, the issue regarding incorporation was raised below, and
the insurance policy was submitted to the district court. It is
therefore appropriate on appeal to examine the entire insurance
policy in determining whether the "minimum statutory limits" were
properly incorporated.
I d a t f 14, fn. 5.
Likewise, while the County did not specifically identify the lease provisions to the
district court, "the issue regarding [the Rio's use] was raised below, and the [Rio's lease

6

The County points out the gap between the Rio's hours of operation and the museum's
hours of operations to illustrate the separate nature of the Rio's use under its lease
relative to the museum's operation. County Brief at 29. The County does not argue that
the gap in hours is determinative, as implied by the Rio, but illustrative. Rio Brief at 20.
The Tax Commission case of Salt Lake County Assessor v. Salt Lake County Board of
Equalization, Appeals 94-1294 through 94-1305, February 3, 1997, cited by the Rio has
no precedential effect in this proceeding.

agreement with the State and the hours of operation were] submitted to the district court.
It is therefore appropriate on appeal to examine the [entire lease agreement and the hours
of operation] in determining whether the [Rio used its property as a concession in, or
relative to, the use of a relevant public facility]." Id. (inserts added). The lease
provisions and the lack of significant overlap in hours support the County's position that
the Rio's use is independent from, and not "in, or relevant to, the use" of the museum.
Thus, the County requests that this Court consider the evidence and arguments it
presented in its initial brief.
POINT II
THE RIO'S POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
IS "ESCAPED PROPERTY."
The Rio argues that since the privilege tax is "imposed on the possession or other
beneficial use" of exempt property, its possessory interest does not qualify as "escaped
property." In 1995, and currently, the term "property" "means property which is subject
to assessment and taxation according to its value...," Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103(19)
(1995) and "includes ... the possession of, claim to, ownership of, or right to the
possession of property. Utah Code § 59-2-103(2 l)(a) (1995)(emphasis added).7 If this

7

As it did in arguing that the County did not preserve its argument for appeal, the Rio
self-servingly misrepresents the County's position. Rio Brief, p. 27, fn. 6. The Rio
claims that the County cited Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102 (19)(1995) to define property,
and that such definition did not include "intangibles" in 1995. The County did not cite to
the statute the Rio criticizes the County for allegedly using. The County cited the 2003
version of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102 (21), which states that "Real estate or property'
includes possessory interests. The provision relied upon by the County has not been
amended since 1995. App. G. It is clear from subsection (21) that, in 1995 and currently,

Court finds that the Rio is subject to privilege tax, such tax will be on "the same amount
that the ad valorem property tax would be if the possessor or user were the owner of the
property," Utah Code Ann. §59-4-101(2)(1995), and would thus be "subject to
assessment and taxation according to its value."
"'Escaped property' means any property, [including possessory interests] whether
personal, land, or any improvements to the property, subject to taxation and is (i)
inadvertently omitted from the tax rolls, assigned to the incorrect parcel, or assessed to
the wrong taxpayer by the assessing authority." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(7)(a)(i)
(1995)(insert added). The privilege tax is "on the [Rio's] possession or other beneficial
use" of the Depot. Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 (l)(a) (1995).
The Rio argues that since "there is no question that the State does not pay property
taxes on its own property," Rio Brief at 29, that the State cannot be the "wrong taxpayer"
for purposes of an escaped property assessment. The term "wrong" means "not
according to truth or facts: INCORRECT." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary
1363 (10th ed. 2001)(emphasis in original). The County did not assess the property to
the right, or correct, taxpayer, when it assessed the Rio's possessory interest to the State
of Utah. Thus, it assessed the unreported parcel to the "wrong" or "incorrect" taxpayer
when it assessed it to an entity other than the Rio. Moreover, the State is required to
"collect and pay a proportional tax" when it purchases property from other taxpayers,
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1101(1) (1995), (emphasis added) thereby making the State a

property includes possessory interests, such as the Rio's possessory interest in the Depot
property.

"taxpayer," or "one that pays or is liable for a tax." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary 1204 (10th ed. 2001). Under the Rio's construction of the statute, an escaped
property assessment would not be assessed if the County Assessor incorrectly assessed
property to an exempt entity, while others whose property is incorrectly assessed to
neighbors or others would be subject to such an assessment. This disparate treatment is
neither fair, nor supported by the plain language of the statute.
The district court agreed with the County's interpretation, but did not impose the
escaped property provisions because it erroneously found that the Rio was not "subject to
taxation" for its possessory interest in the Depot. R. at 659, p. 19, lines 2-3. If this Court
finds that the Rio is "subject to taxation," it requests that this Court uphold the County's
"escaped property" assessment for the 1990-1994 tax years.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE RIO
WAS OPEN ON SATURDAYS FROM 11:30 A.M. - 2:30 P.M.
The only evidence before the district court relating to hours of operation was the
stipulation between the parties, which the Rio relied upon in its Motion for Summary
Judgment. The Stipulation provides that:
The Rio's hours of operation are 11:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. and from 5:00 p.m. to
9:30 p.m. five days a week and from 5:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. on the weekend.
R. at 273, % 9. The Rio did not present any evidence to the contrary, but referred
to evidence not in the record before this Court. The Stipulation of the parties "'acts as an
estoppel upon the parties thereto and is conclusive of all matters necessarily included in
the stipulation."' Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 2001 UT 11, % 20, 20 P.3d 287 (citation

omitted). This discrepancy, though minor, illustrates that the Rio did not operate as a
subsidiary business relative to the other facilities in the Depot, but as a separate, selfcontained operation. Thus, this Court should find that the district court erred and state
the facts according to the parties' stipulation.
RESPONSE TO CROSS APPEAL
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Salt Lake County Board of Equalization, respectfully
submits the following in response to Appellee's Cross-Appeal pursuant to Rule 24 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ARGUMENT
THE RIO IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF LITIGATION EXPENSES
BECAUSE IMPOSITION OF THE PRIVILEGE TAX IS NOT 'A REGULATORY
FUNCTION/ AND BECAUSE THE COUNTY'S POSITION IS NOT WITHOUT
'SUBSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION/
The district court correctly ruled that the Rio is not entitled to an award of
litigation expenses. The Rio fails to identify which of two statutes applies to its specious
claim that it merits an award of litigation expenses; however, the pertinent language in
each statute provides:
In any civil judicial action [or civil judicial appeal] commenced by
the state, which action involves the business regulatory functions of
the state, a court may award reasonable litigation expenses to any
small business which is a named party in the action if the small
business prevails and the court finds that the state action was
undertaken without substantial justification.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27a-4, 5 (2003).

The Rio does not qualify for litigation expenses because (A) the action does not involve
"the business regulatory functions of the state," and (B) the court did not find "that the
state action was undertaken without substantial justification."
A. The Rio's privilege tax exemption claim does not involve the business
regulatory functions of the state.
Because the assessment of a privilege tax does not involve the "business
regulatory functions of the state," the Rio does not qualify for litigation expenses under
§§ 78-27a-4, 5. "Generally speaking, a tax raises revenue for general governmental
purposes, while a fee raises revenue either to compensate the government for the
provision of a specific service or benefit to the one paying the fee or to defray the
government's cost of regulating and policing a business or activity engaged in by one
paying the fee." V-l Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 942 P.2d 906, 911 (Utah
1997)(reversed on motion for rehearing on other grounds).
The privilege tax raises revenue for general governmental purposes and is not a
fee. It is not designed "to defray the government's cost of regulating or policing a
business or activity." Id The Rio has failed to identify what action, if any, the Board is
allegedly regulating, and has failed to describe which "regulatory function" the Board has
allegedly exercised that is relevant to this appeal. The power to tax and the power to
regulate are separate powers derived from separate statutory provisions. Consolidation
Coal Co., et al. v. Emery County, et al., 702 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah 1985)(citing 9 E.
McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 26.15, at 29 (3d ed. Rev. 1978)).

Consolidation Coal involved an ordinance enacted by Emery County to collect a
license fee. The court found that the fee collected was not of a regulatory nature because
"the revenue to be raised from the additional fee provision ... bore no relationship to the
cost of enforcing the ordinance and that the provision was intended as a general revenue
measure with little, if any, regulatory purpose or effect." Id. at 127. The court therefore
struck down the ordinance because the County did not have the statutory authority to
raise revenue, "except insofar as such revenue is necessary to (and therefore
proportionate to the cost of) regulation of the licensed entities." IdL Like the fee in
Consolidation Coal the privilege tax bears no relationship to the cost of enforcing a
statute or ordinance and its purpose is as a general revenue measure with no regulatory
purpose or effect. The difference is that counties have statutory authority to levy a
privilege tax under Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 et seq. whereas Emery County did not
have authority to collect the general revenue raising license fee in Consolidation.
The Rio relies on V-l Oil for the proposition that the assessment and collection of
a tax qualifies as a "business regulatory function of the state" even though the VI-Oil
Court did not address the issue. The United States Supreme Court has held that a prior
decision is not binding precedent on a point not raised in briefs or arguments, or not
discussed in the Court's opinion. United States et al. v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc.,
344 U.S. 33, 37-38 (1952)(stating that the Supreme Court "is not bound by a prior
exercise of jurisdiction in a case where it was not questioned and it was passed sub
silentio"). The VI-Oil court did not address, and the parties did not brief or raise

arguments, relative to whether an act arising out of the taxing powers of the State are
"business regulatory functions" for purposes of §§ 78-27a-4 or 5.
The V-l Oil court did not address whether a tax qualifies as a regulatory function
of the state. The Rio's assumption arises from silence and ignores the findings of the
Utah Supreme Court in other cases where the court distinguished the government's taxing
powers from the government's regulatory powers. See Consolidation Coal Co., 702 P.2d
at 124(stating that a county may impose a license primarily as a means of regulating
businesses, as an exercise of its police power, or it may license to raise revenue, as an
exercise of its taxing power); Weber Basin Home Builders Association v. Roy City, 487
P.2d 866, 867 (Utah 1971)(stating that money collected to service, regulate, or police
activity is a fee; whereas, money collected for general revenue purposes is a tax); Davis
v. Ogden City, 215 P.2d 616, 622 (Utah 1950)(stating that a license fee is based upon
police power to regulate or prohibit a business and tax is intended to raise revenue).
Thus, because the assessment and enforcement of the privilege tax is not a
"regulatory function of the state," but is designed to collect revenue for general
governmental purposes, the Board respectfully requests that this Court deny the Rio's
motion for an award of litigation expenses.
B. The Board did not appeal the Tax Commission's decision "without
substantial justification/9
To support its claim that the County did not have substantial justification to make
its arguments before the district court, the Rio makes the erroneous argument that the
County "quite obviously" does "not have statutory authority to pursue" its good faith

interpretation of exemption statutes. The Rio makes this claim because the County is
"subject to regulation and control by the commission as prescribed by law." Utah Code
Ann. § 59-2-1004 (2003).
The Rio ignores the County's statutory authority to appeal Tax Commission
decisions. Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-602(l)(a) provides that "[a]ny aggrieved party
appearing before the commission or county whose tax revenues are affected by the
decision may at that party's option petition for judicial review in the district court...."
The County is an "aggrieved party" and its tax revenues are affected by the Tax
Commission's liberal interpretation of the concessionaire exemption statute. The Rio's
suggestion that the County "quite obviously" does not have the statutory authority to
appeal Tax Commission decisions is absurd and contrary to the established relationship
between the Tax Commission and the various counties. Even if the County's
interpretation were, as the Rio alleges without support , "self-serving, convenient, and
flawed," Rio Brief at 34, the County still has every right and authority to appeal Tax
Commission decisions that run contrary to its established policy.
The Rio relies on dicta from Vl-Oil to support its claim that the Board has acted
"without substantial justification." The Vl-Oil Court stated, "if a state agency arbitrarily
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The Rio insinuates without support that the County gives special treatment to its own
facilities, and then "they want to fight everybody else." R. at 659, p. 23, lines 4-9. The
Rio does not present any facts or evidence that the County treats concessionaires at
County facilities any differently than it treats potential concessions at facilities owned by
other entities. Had the Rio done its research, it would have discovered that the County
has not granted the concession exemption to several privilege taxpayers using County
facilities. The Rio's use of unsupported accusations and insinuations has no place in an
appellate brief and should be disregarded by this Court.

interpreted a statute to the detriment of a small business, this abuse of the agency's power
by exceeding its scope of discretion in interpreting a statute would support a finding that
the state had acted 'without substantial justification."' 942 P.2d at 915. The Board relied
upon the interpretation of the Michigan statute on which the Utah privilege tax and
concession exemption is based. In Utah and Michigan, exemption statutes are to be
construed strictly in favor of taxation. Because the Utah statute is based upon the
Michigan statute, the Michigan cases relied upon by the Board are the best legal authority
available to the Board and the Assessor's Office to interpret the term "concession" in the
context of a privilege tax exemption. While the Rio and the district court apparently
disagree with the Board, the Rio has not shown how the Board's interpretation is
"arbitrary" when the Salt Lake County Assessor and the Board consistently applied the
standards set forth in the Michigan cases in determining who does and who does not
qualify for the exemption. This Court and the Rio may have found the standard applied
by the Board too strict, but the Rio has not shown how it is "arbitrary."
As the district court found, the County is not "without substantial justification" in
arguing that "the notion of a concession is that of a subsidiary business related to a public
oriented operation," from Michigan case law. R. at 659, p. 14. The County also is
justified in arguing that "[tjhere's nothing in the [Rio's lease] that ties the use of the Rio
to the use of the museum or the use of the Amtrak station," R. at 659, p. 15 where the
statute requires the Rio to show that it uses its property "in, or relative to, the use" of
those facilities, and where the Rio has not identified one lease provision that establishes
such a relationship. Not only is the County substantially justified in making these

arguments, the County has the responsibility and obligation to pursue those arguments
furthering the fair, uniform, and equal assessment of all properties in the County, which
is exactly what it is doing in this case.
The County also argued with "substantial justification" in raising its constitutional
issue before the district court that: (1) the Tax Commission did not have any authority to
address constitutional issues, Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 2001 UT 74, ^ 24, 34
P.3d 180; and (2) the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the County's claim. The Utah
Supreme Court stated, in interpreting the language of Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601, that
section 601, "does not operate only to limit the Commission's discretion in conducting its
article XIII, section 11 duties, it effectively eliminates the Commission's role whenever
one of the parties chooses to seek review under that section. The Commission's prior
decision becomes a nullity, and the district court conducts an original, independent
proceeding." Evans & Sutherland Computer Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435,443
(Utah 1998)(striking as unconstitutional section 601 before constitutional amendment
gave district court jurisdiction to hear "all matters decided" by the Commission).
The County had substantial justification to bring an "original, independent" claim
in the "original, independent proceeding" before the district court. Since the County's
Petition for Review essentially eliminated the Tax Commission's role in the proceedings,
and since the action before the district court was an "original" and "independent"
proceeding, the County's "original" and "independent" constitutional claim was not

"without substantial justification"9 before the district court. For these reasons, the
County requests that this Court uphold the district court's denial of litigation expenses.
CONCLUSION
The County respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the Rio, and grant summary judgment in favor of the
County. The district court erred in finding that the Rio uses its property as a concession
in, or relative to, the use of the other public facilities at the Depot. The County invites
this Court to apply the well-reasoned standard developed by the Michigan courts in
construing the concession exemption statute. Moreover, because the district court erred
in granting the Rio's request for an exemption, this Court should also find the Rio's
possession of the property it uses is "escaped property" for the 1990 - 1994 tax years.
The County also requests that this Court adopt the findings of facts entered into by the
parties in their stipulation. Finally, the County asks this Court to uphold the district
court's order denying the Rio's request for litigation expenses because the Rio's privilege
tax claim neither involved the regulatory functions of the State, nor did the County appeal
the Tax Commission's decision without substantial justification.
DATED this £r_ day of June, 2004.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County District Attorney
Jj^ON S. ROSE
Deputy District Attorney
The County decided not to appeal the district court's order dismissing its constitutional
claim to focus the appeal on the construction of § 59-4-101(3)(a).
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ADDENDUM A
Rio, Inc dba Rio Grade Cafe v. Board of Equalization, USTC 98-1179
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision,
pp. 14-15; R. at 21-22

Appeal No. 98-1179

''The use of property which is a concession in, or relative to. the use
of a public airport, park, fairground, or similar property which is
available as a matter of right to the use of the general public."
(emphasis added)
It is certain that the property at issue in this proceeding is not a public airport, park
or fairground. Therefore, the issue is whether the depot, including the Rio, museum, and Amtrak
Station is a "similar property which is available as a matter of right to the use of the general public."
In this case, the D&RG Depot is a facility being used primarily by the general public,
both as a train station, a museum operated by the State Historical Society, and a public restaurant.
A train station is similar to a public airport. A museum, in this context, is similar to a park. As such,
the Commission determines that the use of the subject property is a "concession in, or relative to,
the use of a public airport, park, fairground, or similar property which is available as a matter of right
to the use of the general public."
Respondent also argues that the Cafe is not "in or relative to" the D&RG Depot or
the museum because the agreement does not require the hours of operation to coincide with the hours
of operation of either the depot or the museum. In fact, due to changes in Amtrack's schedule, no
trains arrive during the hours of operation of the Cafe, as do some passengers awaiting trains. It
appears that visitors to the museum also patronize the Cafe and it is reasonable to assume that the
Cafe itself attracts lunch patrons who then decide to visit the museum. Moreover, the Cafe is clearly
located within the D&RG Depot building. It appears as a separate parcel only because Respondent
chose to give it a special parcel number for tax purposes. Accordingly, we find that the Cafe is both
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"in" a railroad depot and "relative to" the depot and the museum. As noted above, whether or not
the operating hours of the Cafe, the museum and the depot are co-extensive is a matter of contract
between the State and Rio. The fact that the hours are not co-extensive does not prevent this
agreement from constituting a concession "in or relative to" the depot or the museum.
One issue which was initially raised was whether the airport exemption contained in
Section 17A-2-1523, Utah Code Ann. would apply to this situation. In view of the decision of the
Commission determining that the subject property is a concession in, or relative to, a property
similar to the list of properties, the property is exempt from the privilege tax, and it is not necessary
to decide whether the airport exemption applies.
DECISION AND ORDFR
Based upon the foregoing, the Commission determines that the subject property is
exempt from the application of the privilege tax because it constitutes a concession in, or relative
to, the use of a public airport, park, fairground, or similar property which is available as a matter of
right to the use of the general public. The property was not subject to tax, and was therefore not
escaped property under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-102(11) and is not subject to the tax for five (5) years
back under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-217. It is so ordered.
DATED this

?4

day of

^ jyV -;*>,

, 2001.

G. Blaine Davis
Administrative Law Judge
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ADDENDUM B
Board of Equalization Petition for Review,
p.4f 18; R. at 4

15.

After the Rio appealed the assessment made by the Assessor's Office, the

Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County upheld the imposition of the privilege tax and
escaped assessment. The Rio appealed to the Commission.
16.

The Commission determined that the Rio is exempt from the application of

the privilege tax under Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(3)(a). The Commission also found
that because the Rio was not subject to a tax, the property it leases from the State of Utah
does not qualify as escaped property under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(11) and is not
subject to an escaped property assessment for the five years previous to the imposition of
the privilege tax under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-217(1) for the years 1990 through 1994.
First Claim for Relief
17.

Petitioner incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1-16.

18.

The Rio does not use the property leased to it by the State as a "concession

in, or relative to, the use of a public airport, park, fairground, or similar property which is
available as a matter of right to the use of the general public" within the meaning of Utah
Code Annotated § 59-4-101 (3)(a) (2000).
Second Claim for Relief
19.

Petitioner incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1-18.

20.

The Rio's use of the property leased to it by the State qualifies as escaped

property within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated § 59-2-101(11) (2000).
21.

The Rio's use of the property leased to it by the State should be assessed as

escaped property for the five years prior to 1995. Utah Code Annotated § 59-2-217
(2000).
4

ADDENDUM C
Board of Equalization's Reply to the Rio, Inc's Motion for Summary Judgment,
pp. 7-8; R. at 449-50
Board of Equalization's Opposition to the Rio's Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment,
pp. 1-12; R. at 323-35
Affidavit of Max Evans
pp. 1-4; R. at 359-62
Board of Equalization's Opposition to The Rio's Motion to Strike,
pp. 4-5; R. at 545-46

The Rio argues that it is open when people generally eat. Again, this is in the
Rio's best interest as a for profit business. If the Rio were open when hungry people get
off the train after midnight, even though people do not generally eat at that time, then it
might qualify as a concession because such a service would be akin to the services that
municipalities often have to provide. This would distinguish the Rio from its competitors
and justify different tax treatment because this would impose an obligation on the Rio,
with which other similarly situated lessees would not have to deal. Because the Rio's
obligations are no different than the obligations that all lessees have to deal with, the Rio
should bear its fair burden of the tax roll.
The Rio also argues that if it is not a "concession," it should receive the exemption
because it is "relative to" a concession. The Rio misreads the statute. The statute is
limited to a concession which is "in," or a concession which is "relative to," "the use of a
public airport... or similar property. . .." Under the doctrines of noscitur a sociis,
ejusdem generis, as well as the last antecedent rule, no other interpretation of subsection
(3)(a) can be reasonably ascertained. In re Disconnection of Certain Territory from
Highland City, 668 P.2d 544, 547-48 (Utah 1983)(fmding that where general language is
used together with specific words familiar rules of construction {noscitur a sociis, "it is
known from its associates," and ejusdem generis, "of the same kind") require that the
general words be restricted to a sense analogous to the specific words) (citations omitted).
Moreover, under the "last antecedent rule," "qualifying words and phrases are generally
regarded as applying to the immediately preceding words, rather than to more remote
ones." Ferro v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507, 511 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The
7

Rio has failed to show that it is "in" the museum or Amtrak station, and it has also failed
to establish that it is "relative to" or "in connection with" the museum or Amtrak station.
Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary , Tenth Edition at 984.
An examination of the Rio's lease with the State of Utah reveals that nothing
distinguishes the Rio from other similarly situated taxpayers. If the construction favored
by the Rio prevails, it will create a gap in the tax laws contrary to the stated intent of the
Utah legislature. For this reason, the Board requests that this Court grant its Motion for
Summary Judgment.
3- THE RIO'S USE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS ESCAPED
PROPERTY BECAUSE THE RIO'S USE OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY IS PROPERTY SUBJECT TO TAXATION WHICH THE
ASSESSOR ASSESSED TO THE WRONG TAXPAYER FOR THE
YEARS 1990 TO 1994.
The Rio's use of the property it leases from the state of Utah is escaped property.
"'Escaped property' means any property, whether personal, land, or any improvements to
the property, subject to taxation and is: (i) ... assessed to the wrong taxpayer by the
assessing authority." Utah Code Annotated § 59-2-102(11) (2002). Moreover, "[a]ny
escaped property may be assessed by the original assessing authority at any time as far
back as five years prior to the time of discovery, in which case the assessing authority
shall enter the assessments on the tax rolls...." Utah Code Annotated § 59-2-217, 309
(2002).
The Rio's use of the subject property is "escaped property" because it qualifies as
"any property ... subject to taxation ... [which was] assessed to the wrong taxpayer."
Before the Commission, the Rio argued that because the privilege tax is on the "use" of
8
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH,
Petitioner,

COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION'S OPPOSITION TO
THE RIO, INC's CROSS MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Tax Commission Appeal No. 98-1179

-vsUTAH TAX COMMISSION EX REL RIO,
INC. dba RIO GRANDE CAFE,

Case No. 010906152
Judge: L.A. Dever

Respondents.
Petitioner County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County ("Board"), hereby
submits the following memorandum in opposition to the Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment submitted by the Respondent Rio, Inc., dba Rio Grande Cafe ("Rio").

DISPUTED FACTS
The Rio admits that it does not dispute the facts as set forth by the Board in its
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. However, the Rio
introduces several facts arising from irrelevant and otherwise inadmissible evidence and
submits several other facts the validity of which the Board disputes. The Board set forth
those facts that the Board contends are inadmissible in its Motion to Strike filed
concurrently with this Memorandum. This Memorandum addresses those facts that may
or may not be admissible, but that the Board disputes with accompanying affidavits and
other evidence. To show that there are material issues of material fact under the Rio's
theory of the case, the Board has included the lease agreement entered into between the
State and the Rio ("Lease") (attached hereto as Exhibit A); the affidavits of Max Evans
(attached hereto as Exhibit B), Alan Andrus (attached hereto as Exhibit C), Alyn
Lunceford (attached hereto as Exhibit D), and Tom West (attached hereto as Exhibit E);
and the State Tax Commission's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (attached
hereto as Exhibit F). The Board disputes the following facts set forth by the Rio in its
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and certain facts alleged in the Rio's
accompanying affidavits and in the State Tax Commission's Statement of Facts for the
reasons described below:

2

1.

The Board does not dispute that the Rio operates a for-profit restaurant at

the Denver & Rio Grande Depot ("Depot") or that the State of Utah owns the land,
building and facilities of the Depot. That the Rio pays personal property taxes on its
personal property as required under Utah law is not relevant to whether the real property
the Rio uses is a concession. (Rio Statement of Facts % 1; Board's Motion to Strike at 89)
2.

The Board does not dispute that the State History Museum and Railroad

station are open as a matter of right to the general public. (Rio Statement of Facts f 2)
The Board alleges, however, that the State History Museum is not open to the public
during a significant amount of time that the Rio is open and any overlap in hours between
the Rio's hours of operation and in the Musuem's hours of operation is coincidental.
(Max Evans Aff. <|ffl5, 10) During the years in question, the Museum operated from 8:00
a.m. - 5:00 p.m. on weekdays and 10:00 a.m. - 3:00 p.m. on Saturday. (Utah State Tax
Commission Findings of Fact ^f 16) Moreover, the Amtrak train, for the years in dispute,
arrived at the Railroad station twice daily. Neither arrivals nor departures are during the
hours of operation of either the Museum or the Rio. Train No. 5 arrives at 12:01 a.m. and
departs at 12:40 a.m. Train No. 6 arrives at 4:40 a.m. and departs at 5:20 a.m. (Utah
State Tax Commission Findings of Fact f 15)

3

3.

The Board disputes the assertion that the State intended that the Rio have

the exclusive right to sell food and drinks at the Denver & Rio Grande Depot at 300
South State. (Rio Statement of Facts t 3; Peter Henderson Aff. f 3; Milne Aff. ffif 3, 6)
In fact, the lease clearly states that the "State reserves the right to sell, dispense or
contract for the sale of food and non-food items in other areas of the building" occupied
by the Rio and the State. (Lease f 2) The Rio also has no right to provide catering
services for specially arranged luncheons or banquets held in those parts of the building
not occupied by the Rio. (Lease ^f 6) There is also no evidence in the lease agreement to
support the Rio's claim that the State's representative and the Rio's predecessor in
interest discussed the Rio being a first-class facility in a less than first-class
neighborhood, that certain standards of service must be met, and that the Rio remain open
six days per week. (Rio Statement of Facts 1 3 ; Peter Henderson Aff. f 2) In fact, the
Board affirmatively alleges that the Rio does not have any standards of service or other
obligations to the Utah Division of State History ("Division"), the entity that operates the
Museum adjacent to the space used by the Rio. The Division has no oversight over the
use of the property used by the Rio. The use of the space occupied by the Rio is
independent from, and not in any way connected to, the use of the space occupied by the
Division including the Museum, its offices, and storage areas. (Max Evans Aff. f 5)
Moreover, the Division has no authority to require the Rio to use its property in a way
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beneficial to the Museum or its employees and visitors and the Rio is not necessary or
beneficial to the adjacent Museum. In many important respects, the Rio is a liability to
the adjacent Museum. (Max Evans Aff. ff 6-8, 10) Furthermore, the lease agreement
speaks for itself and does not contain any of the provisions that the parties allegedly
discussed in negotiating the subject contract. (Lease) Finally, to the extent such
discussions did or did not take place, such evidence is inadmissible because it violates the
parol evidence rule. (Motion to Strike at 6-8)
4.

The Board does not dispute that the Rio's hours of operation are as stated

(Rio Statement of Facts 14), but disputes that the Lease limits the Rio's hours of
operations (Lease) and disputes that its hours of operation are designed to serve visitors
or employees of the adjacent museum or train station. (See 1 2 above)
5.

The Board does not dispute that the recitals to the Lease provide as stated

(Rio Statement of Facts f 5), but the Board alleges that the Lease does not maintain any
service requirements or time requirements to ensure that the Rio operates for the
convenience of employees, visitors, and the general public of the State visiting those
public facilities. (Lease; Tflf 2, 4 above).
6.

The Board does not dispute that the restrooms shared by the Rio and the

Depot/Museum are included in the Rio's privilege tax assessment (Rio Statement of Facts
f 6). The Board alleges, however, that the restrooms are open and used by the Rio's

employees and patrons while the Museum is closed to the public (Tom West Aff. f 10)
and are used by the Rio in its for-profit business. (Tom West Aff. f 11)
7.

The Board does not dispute that neither the Rio nor the State of Utah had

any control over the scheduling of the passenger train service to and from Salt Lake City
provided by Amtrak. (Rio Statement of Facts f 7) The Board contends that this is not
relevant to whether the use of the space by the Rio constitutes a concession. (Motion to
Strike at 8-9)
8.

The Board disputes the claim made by Peter Henderson that the lease

payments made to the state were competitive with privately owned rental space in a
similar area and that such private lease payments to a private landlord would include an
amount equivalent to the taxes that a private landlord would use to pay property taxes.
The Board also disputes Peter Henderson's claim that if the Rio must pay a privilege tax,
it would amount to double taxation. (Peter Henderson Aff. f 5) The Rio's lease rate was
below market rents for similar space in the area during the subject time period, (Alan
Andrus Aff. fflf 4-5), and the Lease contained very favorable provisions in the Rio's
favor. (Alan Andrus Aff. ff 6, 8).
9.

During the time in question, tenant-restaurateurs leasing from private

landlords were generally required to pay all property taxes in addition to the base rent and
that property taxes did not inhere in the base rent of leases in the market during the

applicable time period. (Alan Andrus Aff. ^ 7) Those leasing space from private
landlords paid property taxes during the subject years, but the Rio did not pay any real
property taxes or privilege taxes during the subject years. (Alan Andrus Aff. fflf 7-9)
10.

The Board also disputes the statement of Joyce Milne in her affidavit that

"it was the intent of the State Building Board in 1981 to seek a suitable concessionaire to
occupy the north wing of the Denver & Rio Grande Depot Building" (Milne Aff. ^ 3)
and that the state entered into "an exclusive concession" with the Rio. (Milne Aff. | 6)
Nothing in the lease indicates that the Rio is a "concession" or that it has an exclusive
right to operate its for-profit restaurant in the Denver & Rio Grande Depot Building.
Furthermore, the State Division of Facilities Construction and Maintenance, which is the
lessor of the premises occupied by the Rio, takes no position on whether the Rio is or is
not a concession. (Alyn Lunceford Aff. f^[ 2 -6) The documents attached to Alyn
Lunceford's Affidavit also demonstrate that the State did not intend for the lessee to be a
concession. (Alyn Lunceford Aff. attached documents)

ARGUMENT
1. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY THE RIP'S CROSS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES
OF MATERIAL FACT UNDER THE RIP'S THEORY OF THE CASE.
Because the Board disputes several of the material facts the Rio sets forth to
support its theory in its Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court should deny the
Rio's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that summary judgment is only appropriate "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact...."
Because the lease agreement at issue in this case does not contain any material
service requirements, hours of operation, or other obligations that would qualify the Rio
as a concessionaire under the case law cited by the Board in its Motion for Summary
Judgment, the Rio has attempted to inject such provisions into the lease by relying on
unsubstantiated legal conclusions that the State sought out a "concessionaire" (Joyce
Milne Aff. ffif 3,4, and 6), and other lease provisions that plainly are not in the lease.
(Peter Henderson Aff. ffl[ 1-3) Furthermore, the Rio attempts to paint a picture of itself as
a restaurant that is in operation for the sole purpose of serving the public good, the State
Historical Society and its employees and patrons, and the Train Station and its employees
and patrons at a sacrifice to itself. The facts set forth by the Board disputes this notion.

The lease does not grant the Rio the exclusive right to serve food at the Depot, as
required by the case law cited by the Board, so the Rio tries to inject the concept of
exclusivity into the lease through Peter Henderson (Peter Henderson Aff. f 3) and Joyce
Milne (Joyce Milne Aff. fflf 3, 6)(Disputed Facts f 3). The lease does not contain the
specific obligations normally inherent in a concession, so the Rio has tried to inject
obligations into the lease agreement that do not exist. (Peter Hendeson Aff. fflf 1-3;
Disputed Facts | 3) The lease itself is not characterized as a concession, so the Rio
attempts to have a former employee of the state characterize it as such, even though the
State has not taken a position on whether the Rio is or is not a concessionaire under Utah
law. (Joyce Milne Aff 1fl[ 3 - 4, 6; Alyn Lunceford Aff. | 6; Disputed Facts f 10)
The Board has clearly set forth admissible and competent evidence to show a
material issue of material fact under the Rio's theory of the case. As the Utah Court of
Appeals stated: "cross-motions [for summary judgment] may be viewed as involving a
contention by each movant that no genuine issue of material fact exists under the theory it
advances, but not as a concession that no dispute remains under the theory advanced by
its adversary." Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Likewise, the Board contends, and the Rio agrees, that the facts it sets forth under its
theory of the case are undisputed. (Rio's Memorandum in Opposition to the Board's
Motion for Summary Judgment at 1) However, it is clear that the facts set forth under the

Rio's theory of the case have been adequately disputed by the Board. For this reason, the
Board respectfully requests that this Court deny the Rio's Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment.

2. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY THE RIO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE RIO IS NOT ENTITLED TO
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW,
The Rio is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law under its theory of this case.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is
appropriate when "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." As the
Board's disputed facts show herein, the Board disputes the Rio's portrayal of itself as a
restaurant whose purpose is to serve the public good akin to services provided by a
municipal entity. The Rio is clearly a for-profit restaurant that has avoided paying taxes
on the use of its property that its competitors have to pay, giving it a clear advantage over
such competitors and in direct contradiction of the stated purpose behind the privilege
tax. Great Salt Lake Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 573 P.2d 337,
339 (Utah 1977)("the obvious legislative intention was to close any gaps in the tax laws
by imposing a tax on any property possessed or used in connection with a business forprofit which was otherwise exempt from taxation").

The favorable terms of the lease between the Rio and the State already give the
Rio an advantage over its competitors (Alan Andrus Aff. f| 4-9), and hardly justify
allowing the Rio to transfer its share of the tax burden onto other taxpayers. The
concession exemption is designed to assist those encumbered by specific obligations of
service and time, not to benefit for-profit restaurants that coincidentally share space with
a public institution, especially when the Rio presents little or no benefit to the adjacent
Museum and train station, and has at times presented liabilities. (Max Evans Aff.fflf410)
Because the Board has demonstrated that there are material issues of material fact
under the Rio's theory of the case, and because the Rio is not entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law, the Board respectfully requests that this Court deny the Rio's Cross
Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this i ^ T day of February, 2003.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County District Attorney

S. pa-*jQjN S.
S.R
JASQ^J
ROSE
Deputy District Attorney
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH,

:

AFFIDAVIT OF MAX J. EVANS

:

Tax Commission Appeal No. 01-1041

Petitioner,
Civil No. 010906152
v.
:
UTAH TAX COMMISSION EX REL RIO
INC. dba RIO GRANDE CAFE,
Respondent.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

:
:

)
: SS.
)

Judge L.A. Dever

Max J. Evans being duly sworn upon oath states as follows:
1.

I am at least eighteen years old and I am currently the Director of the

Utah Division of State History ("Division"). My office is located at 300 Rio Grande in
Salt Lake City, Utah;
2.

I have served as the Director for the Utah Division of State History

for fifteen years;
3.

The Rio Grande Cafe ("Rio") occupies and uses space rented from

the State of Utah adjacent to space used by the Division. The Rio occupies and uses such
space to operate a restaurant. The Division occupies and uses its space for a public
museum; a public bookstore; offices; and storage space used to store historical
documents, books, manuscripts, photos, and artifacts related to the purposes of the
Division;
4.

Besides the restrooms and a connecting hallway, which separate the

space used by the Rio from the space used by the Division, the Rio does not occupy or
use any space within the confines of the space used by the Division. The restrooms serve
both patrons to the museum and patrons to the Rio;
5.

The Rio is not essential or necessary to the operation of the museum,

the offices, or the storage areas operated by the Division. The use of the space occupied
by the Rio is independent from, and not in any way connected to, the use of the space
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occupied by the Division, including the museum, its offices, and storage areas. There is
no access from the Rio to the museum after the museum closes at 5:00 p.m. on the
weekdays or at 3:00 p.m. on Saturdays;
6.

The use of the Rio as a restaurant poses a substantial risk of fire

and/or water damage to the space and materials kept by the Division. Any residual
benefit provided by the use of the Rio as a restaurant is offset by such risk. The Division
has previously incurred costs to clean up damage from flooding as a result of the Rio's
use of the property it leases from the State of Utah. This damage arose from use of the
restaurant after the museum's normal operating hours;
7.

The Division stores and displays many historically significant

materials that would be difficult, if not impossible, to replace if damaged or destroyed;
8.

The Division has use for the space currently used by the Rio;

9.

While the use of the Rio as a restaurant does increase traffic to the

museum operated by the Division, nobody has quantified the effect of such increase on
the museum and I would describe any such effect as marginal. Nothing indicates that
traffic to the museum benefits the Rio;
10.

The hours of operation of the museum and the Rio do not fully

coincide and any overlap in hours is coincidental. The Rio does not have any obligations
to the Division. The Division has no oversight of the use of the property used by the Rio,

J

and has no authority to require the Rio to use its propen\ in .iH•l i \, \, hetH•f u• i,i
Division or the use of the property used by the Division;
11

1 ha \ e pei sonal kno vledge of the statenients made herein.

DATED this / j £ day of February, 2002.

MAX J. F t *.VDirector
Utah Division of State History

Subscribed and Sworn to me this

iA

Notary Puttie ~ *1

JANICE HEED-CAMPBELL,
300RJoGfind»
I
Salt Lake City, Utan 8410M182
My Commission Exptos
(
Fsfcrua/y 7,2005
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L/\ISC>
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day of February, 2002.

Rio's lease with the state, but that Alyn Lunceford, as a DCFM "manager," does not have
authority to take "no position" as to whether the Rio constitutes a concession. The difference
between the Lunceford Affidavit and the Milne Affidavit is that Alyn Lunceford does not make
impermissible legal conclusions and Milne does, which is one reason why the Board argues that
Milne's Affidavit should be striken in its Motion to Strike. (Board's Motion to Strike at 5) For
the reasons set forth herein, the Board requests that this Court deny the Rio's Motion to Strike ff
4-6 of the Lunceford Affidavit.

2.

Because Max Evans5 testimony reflects the relationship between the Rio and the
State History Museum during his tenure, which included the relevant lien dates
of January 1,1990 through January 1,1995, his so-called "stale" testimony is
especially relevant as it applies to this case.
The Max Evans Affidavit (the "Evans Affidavit") signed by him on February 1, 2002,

during his tenure as Director of the Utah Division of State History, reflects the relationship
between the Rio and the Division of State History during his tenure and the years in question in
this dispute. This testimony speaks to the existence of facts "of consequence to the
determination of the action" because it applies to the time period between January 1, 1990 and
January 1, 1995, the relevant time period in this case. Utah R. Evid. 401.
The Rio argues that the Evans Affidavit includes opinions that "are stale and irrelevant,
as he could not now testify in any official capacity to his official opinion at the present time."
(Rio Motion to Strike at 3) Mr. Evans so called "stale" opinions, however, are especially
relevant to show that the Museum he directed had no authority to impose specific obligations on
the Rio to benefit the public's use of the State History Museum, and to show that the use of the
subject property by the Rio was not "relative to" the use of the Museum from 1990 - 1995, the
relevant time period in this dispute. The Rio fails to explain why events on which it relies, which

4

Evans' tenure as director of the State History Museum, which included the relevant tax years, are
not. (Evans Aff 1 2 ) Moreover, by arguing that "[lease] Amendment N umber 3, w hich the
[Board] will agree speaks for itself, effectively disclaims the validity of Mr. Evans' opinions"
(Rio Motion to Strike Affidavit at 3), the Rio would have this Court impermissibly weigh the
1; tli

<

•' • 4 1

"-i»» i> .:.;

1: :

•• • is

!|

ffida < it. and not its i elei ance Spoi v Crested Butte Silver Mining Co.,

^, 1308 (Utah 1987)(stating that in summary judgment proceedings that trial court

appropriate for court to weigh disputed evidence, only to determine whether material issues of
•fact existsVciting WM. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 62 7 P.2d 56, 59 ( Utah
1981)).
Therefore, because the Evans Affidavit "is of consequence to the determination" of
w liethei the R io cp lalified as "a concession in. , • :>i reiatii • e to. the i ise r of the State Histon >
Museum for the relevant time period, the Evans Affidavit is admissible as it applies to the Rio's

Evans Affidavit. Utah R. Evid. 401; Utah Code Annotated § 59-4-101(3)(a) (2002).

3.

Alan Andrus' statements are relevant to dispute statements set forth by the Rio
as material facts in the First Henderson Affidavit.
I he Man !"!l|i ndi us \ ffida> it (the ' \ iicli us i \ ffida It" ") Is rele\ a lit t : disp i ite mai ket

conditions claimed to exist by Peter Henderson in the First Henderson Affidavit, and to dispute
whether the Rio would be subject to "double taxation" if this Coui t finds that tl le Rio is subject
to the privilege tax imposed on for-profit businesses which use otherwise exempt property.
(First Henderson A fi H 5) The Rio criticizes the Board for attempting to introduce evidence to
5
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reviewed the two volumes that I received, as well as the reply-

2

on the affidavits that I received on Friday, I believe.

3

MR. ROSE:

Thank you, your Honor.

4

May it please the Court, Salt Lake County has filed

5

a motion for summary judgment on this tax dispute with the Rio

6

Grande Cafe.

7

entitled to summary judgment because there are no genuine

8

issues of material fact and because the issues presented to

9

this Court are (inaudible).
The County's motion for summary judgment, the—the

10
11

The County—the County believes that it is

evidence we presented in support of that motion consists—
THE COURT:

12

Now, Mr. Rose, that thing goes up and

13

down if it's—I mean the whole podium goes up and down if it's

14

too far down or too far up.

15

your waist that you can move it up and down if you'd like.

16

MR. ROSE: Oh.

17

THE COURT:

18

The bailiff will show you how to do it

if you'd like.

19

MR. ROSE:

20

THE COURT:

21

There's just a little button by

Okay.

Thank you, your Honor.

Sometimes tall people have a problem

with it.

22

MR. ROSE:

Can you hear me okay?

23

THE COURT:

I can hear you fine.

24

MR. ROSE:

25

The—as I was saying, your Honor, we

believe that there are—there are no issues of material fact
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connection with a business conducted for profit.

I don't

2

think the parties dispute that the Rio falls under that

3

language.
Where the dispute occurs is in Section 3. A tax i s

4
5

not imposed under this chapter on the following:

The use of

6

property which is a concession in or relative to the use of a

7

public airport, park, fairground or similar property which is

8

available as a matter of right to the use of the general

9

public.

10

I don't think the parties dispute whether the Rio or

11

the museum or the Amtrax station are open as a matter of right

12

to the general public.

13

relates to the first part of that statute, the use of property

14

which is a concession in or relative to the use of the public

15

facility.

I believe that the—the dispute i s —

I think there are two cardinal principles of

16
17

taxation in Utah that we need to look at when determining if a

18

party is subject or is—is able to receive a tax exemption.

19

In Utah, all property is declared taxable unless otherwise

20

exempt.

21

The privilege tax was imposed to insure equality.

22

The Supreme Court says that the purpose of the privilege tax

23

is to close any gaps in the tax law between owners of property

24

and lessees of property.

25

owned its property had to pay taxes where a lessee who was

It was unfair that a business who

6
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MR. R O S E :
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7
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. ROSE:

The three-prong test?
I think the Interwest case is very

3

general.

4

under the privilege tax itself in order to qualify for the

5

exemption.

is privilege tax, is there?
MR. ROSE: No.

8
9

And it states general if—if it isn't—

THE COURT: Well, there isn't any question that this

6
7

It states that you have to—first, you have to fall

I don't—there's no question at all.

The—the problem with the Interwest case, for our purposes,

10

is, it doesn't define concession and it doesn't explain what a

11

party needs to do to—to prove that—its agreement with the

12

exempt entity is a—is a concession.
So, for that reason, the County has turned to the

13
14

Michigan cases because, one, they have the same rules of

15

statutory construction, the statutory language is the same and

16

Michigan also—the Michigan cases have the same policies that

17

the cases in Utah talk about, the quality and uniformity of

18

taxation, making sure that the gaps in the tax laws are—are

19

closed.

20
21

There are a couple of Michigan cases I'd like to
bring to the Court's attention, if I may.

22

THE COURT: Uh huh.

23

MR. ROSE: May I approach, your Honor?

24

THE COURT: You may.

25

MR. ROSE: This is a Michigan case from 1996 that

8

1

deals with a—a golf course that claimed, much like the Rio,

2

that it qualified for the concession agreement.

3
4

I would like to read some of the fourth page and I
think I've starred it.

5

THE COURT: Yes.

6

MR. ROSE:

7

Court is—applies to this case or is—it's very similar.
The provisions in the lease contract between the

8
9

I believe that this explanation by the

parties do not rise to the level of specific obligations on

10

the part of petitioner, the privileged party, to main

11

particular—to maintain particular services at specified

12

times.

13

hours of operation or petitioner's standard of service or for

14

respondent's oversight of the golf course operations.

15

The provisions do not include requirements for minimum

I believe like in this case, the State is basically

16

turning the operations over to the Rio.

17

basic lease obligations they need to abide by that any other

18

lessee would have to—to also fall under.

19

They've given them

While the lease provisions demonstrate that

20

respondent had some control over the operations, the

21

provisions address broader management issues rather than

22

specific obligations.

23

provides that respondent has the right to change the prices

24

charged by petitioner.

25

For example, the lease in this case

The State in this case, your Honor, and the Rio has-

1

-has no ability to—to oversee the—the prices of goods that

2

the Rio sells.

3

And the Semore court observed, however, that the

4

oversight of fees charged to the public is not strenuous.

5

this case, they're non-existent, in the Rio.

6

this case, respondent had the right to inspect and regulate

7

the maintenance of the property.

8

the maintenance was consistent with—consistent with the

9

city's goal in protecting the property and that it did not

10

In

Likewise, in

The Semore court stated that

exact a specific term or service for the public benefit.

11

Next page.

Also, the record does not contain

12

evidence that the purchase of the golf course was reasonably

13

related to the public purposes of respondent city.

14

that if you look at this particular lease, your Honor, t h e —

15

there is nothing in the lease that ties the Rio to the museum.

16

It—it is next to the museum, but if you took the museum away,

17

there would be nothing in the lease to change because the

18

museum and the Rio are not tied up in any way in this

19

agreement.

20

I think

It appears that respondent merely privatized the

21

operation of the golf course, thereby permitting petitioner to

22

have an unfair advantage over entities leasing privately owned

23

property.

24

golf course would thus be contrary to the purpose of the

25

lessee user tax act.

Granting a concession exception to petitioner's

10

1

I

Likewise, in—in the reading—in this case, your

2

(Honor, there's nothing in this lease agreement between the Rio

3

| and the State that distinguishes the Rio from—from other

4

(taxpayers; therefore, the Rio would have an unfair advantage

5

I over entities leasing privately owned property, such as other

6

! restaurants in the neighborhood.

7

THE COURT: Well, the contract says that the State

8

desires to have a restaurant operated in the location for the

9

convenience of employees, visitors and the general public of

10

the State.

You agree with that, don't you?

11

MR. ROSE:

12

THE COURT:

13
14

Yes.
Okay.

I do.
And isn't that really all that a

concession is is a grant?
MR. ROSE:

Under the plain language of—of the word

15

"concession" in the dictionary, I—I concede that it is just a

16

grant and—

17

THE COURT: And if all the—all the State has to do

18

to establish a concession is to give a grant, then what more

19

do I need to look at?

20

MR. ROSE:

That's a very fair question, your Honor.

21

I believe that if you interpret the statute that way, that it

22

sill defeat the purpose of the privilege tax.

23

THE COURT: Why?

24

MR. ROSE:

25

If the Rio—if there's nothing to

distinguish the Rio from other lessees as far as the economic

11

1

reality of their—their whole purpose, then you are treating

2

two similarly-situated entities differently for no material

3

reason.
The Rio is not competing against restaurants at the

4
5

airport or—it's competing against restaurants in the

6

community.

7

just expressed, which is basically the—the Rio's argument, it

8

goes against the spirit of—of the tax laws in Utah, that

9

people be treated uniformly and—

10

I think if you construe the statute the way you

THE COURT:

So, you're saying that because the

11

airport is sort of a closed system and everybody at the

12

airport is on the same playing field, that that's something

13

that I should consider in deciding whether or not the Rio

14

Grande is a concession or not?

15

MR. ROSE:

16

THE COURT:

I think so, your Honor.
Another point, your Honor, the—the

17

statute requires more than just the concession agreement.

18

requires a concession—I want to get the language perfectly—

19

the use of property which is a concession in or relative to

20

the use of another public facility.

21

the specific obligations come in, the—why give a tax

22

exemption here?

23

exception for concessions?

24
25

It

And I think that's where

Why would the legislature want to make an

If you read the Michigan cases, I think it's because
the concession's coming in and doing something that the State

12

would otherwise have to do for a public purpose.
In this case, there's nothing in the agreement
besides the one recital we recited which requires the Rio to
provide a public service that's relative to the—the museum.
THE COURT:

Well, I mean, their agreement is, is

that we have this huge public facility that has a museum and
it has other—an art gallery, and visitors come there and
people work there. And it would be appropriate, the State
thinks, to have a restaurant there for the convenience of
those visitors and employees.
And because the State thinks that would be of
benefit to the citizens, it grants to the Rio Grande the right
to have a restaurant; does it not?
MR. ROSE: And I agree with that.

I think it is

totally appropriate to have a restaurant in that location. I
think that the reason the Rio should not get a tax exemption
is that the State just turned the entire operation over to the
Rio and it says, here you go, we want you to run a restaurant
and that is an obligation that they do have to abide by, but
otherwise, we're going to turn the operation over to you.
There's another—
THE COURT:

Well, could this—couldn't the State

have said when it entered into the contract with the Rio
Grande, that—that we specifically determine that this is not
to be viewed as a concession and you are not a concessionaire

13

1
2
3

for the purposes of the statute?
MR. ROSE:

The State could have said that. The

State could—

4

THE COURT:

5

said that, would we?

And we wouldn't have a problem if they

6

MR. ROSE:

7

actual terms of the agreement.

8

THE COURT:

9

I think we'd still have to look at the
I don't think—

Well, if that's what they said in the

agreement, we wouldn't have a problem; right?

10

MR. ROSE:

11

THE COURT:

If they said w e —
If they said in the contract that they

12

signed with the Rio Grande, for the purposes of this—this

13

contract, this is not to be viewed as a concession for

14

exemptions under the tax code.

15

MR. ROSE:

I'm not sure I would agree with that,

16

your Honor, because then you could have—this actually goes

17

into a—another argu—another case, if I may.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. ROSE:

Uh huh.
This is the Semore versus Dalton

20

(inaudible).

On Page 3, I'd like to skip down to the blocked

21

quote and the—here's the—the court—the court explaining its

22

notion of a concession.

23

a subsidiary business related to a public oriented operation.

24

A holding to the contrary that would allow for a self-

25

contained public entity leased to the private sector to

The notion of a concession is that of

14

1

qualify as a concession, would give carte blanche to a

2

governmental unit to lease out for profit one of any number of

3

jgovernmental enterprises and with minimal operations on its

4

operation, gain for it a favored tax status by simply

5

denominating it a concession.

6

I think there are certain requirements that have to

7

be met before the—the substantive obligations in the

8

concession that need to be met in order for it to fall within

9

the public—the purpose of the statute.

10

The construction that you stated or just calling a

11

concession a grant swallows the privilege tax rule.

12

trying to put—close the gaps in the tax law, it doesn't make

13

sense to just call something a concession while ignoring its

14

substantive provisions to insure that it's actually

15

accomplishing a public purpose.

16

THE COURT: Okay.

17

Anything further?

18

MR. ROSE:

If we're

I would just like to in—on that issue,

19

in conclusion, I think that if you look at the Rio, it's

20

leasing the property from the State and it happens to be an

21

(inaudible) facility.

22

that it's there in order to enhance or that it's somehow

23

relative to the museum.

24

itself that ties the use of the Rio to the use of the museum

25

or the use of the Amtrax station.

There's really no evidence presented

There's nothing in the agreement

15

And I think that granting the Rio the concessionaire

1
2

exemption in this case would violate the spirit and the—the

3

principles of the tax law that everyone be treated uniformly

4

and equally.
THE COURT: Would you say—I mean, we look at—we

5
6

look at the—this place originally went into business 20-some

7

years ago; right?

1981?

8

MR. ROSE:

9

THE COURT:

1981, that's correct.
And when it went into business in 1981,

10

the area where it was located was a fairly run-down section of

11

the city, was it not?

12

MR. ROSE:

13

THE COURT:

14

Well, I think there's some—there's some—

15

MR. ROSE:

16
17

I was eleven years old at the time.
You don't know?

I've heard—I've heard as much, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

There's some information in the file

18

that indicates that this was not exactly the nicest part of

19

Salt Lake City.

20

MR. ROSE: Correct.

21

THE COURT: And the facilities—there were no

22

facilities for the public, to speak of.

23

decided it wanted to make the Rio Grande station a—a place

24

where the public would feel comfortable going to, put a museum

25

there, the trains came there. And that in order to entice the

16

And the government

1

public, so to speak, they would put a restaurant there for the

2

public to eat, so that if they did go to the museum and spend

3

several hours there, they would have a place that they could

4

go to eat and the employees who worked there would have a

5

place they could feel safe going to, having a meal without

6

trekking long distances.

7

And so therefore, they gave the Rio Grande the right

8

to open a restaurant there for the benefit of employees,

9

visitors and the general public.

If that was the purpose

10

stated in it, then why shouldn't it be viewed as a grant and

11

organization simply because today, in this day and age, the

12

original intent may have changed—I shouldn't say the original

13

intent, the—the basis for the original intent may have

14

changed, doesn't change the original intent, does it?

15

MR. ROSE:

Well, first off, I'm not absolutely

16

certain that all the facts that you've set forth are—are true

17

and correct facts.

18

those and as I said, I was eleven years old at that time, so

19

I—I don't know what the—but your point is well taken.

20

I—I don't have any facts in opposition to

And I think that again, the County disagrees with

21

the construction, the statutory construction of calling a

22

concession a grant.

23

the statute, and we believe that the principle, under

24

principles of statutory construction, there should be—we

25

would urge the Court to follow the specific obligation

I think that it defeats the purpose of

17

1
2

requirements set forth in the Michigan

case.

I—I don't see how turning—merely turning the

3

restaurant over to the Rio to operate in the market, to

4

compete against other similarly situated persons justifies

5

granting the Rio special tax treatment—

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. ROSE:

8
9

Uh huh.
—unless the State has some oversight

over the way the Rio is run.
THE COURT:

10

MR. ROSE:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. ROSE:

Okay.

Very well.

And I believe that's our argument.
Thank you very much, Mr. Rose.
The other issues that we've raised deals

13

with escaped property, if you do find that the Rio is subject

14

to the privilege tax.

15

whether we—whether the County has statutory authority to

16

appendix the prior five years or to assess the—the value of

17

the Rio's property interest, I believe it's for '91 through

18

'94, it may be '90 through '94, your Honor.

19

We have entered into a dispute as to

The—Rio has argued that there's a difference

20

between property tax and privilege tax.

21

and the County's never argued that we have a lien on the

22

property through—through the privilege tax; but I think that

23

if you look at the definition—

24

THE COURT:

25

I concede that point

Well, actually—actually, Mr. Rose, you

don't have to spend a lot of time on this, because I—their

18
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kitchen and dining area located in the north wing" (Lease Agreement, p. 1, attached as
Exhibit "B") of the Depot, to provide the particular services of "a food preparation and
dispensing facility" (p. 1) and "as a restaurant/cafeteria" (p. 2), "for the convenience of
employees, visitors, and the general public of the State" (p.l). In doing so, the lessee must
meet a particular standard to "provide a sufficient number of employees to provide prompt,
efficient service" (p. 6). Thus, five of the six Tygard "incidents of a concession" are found
in the Rio's lease. Only a specific provision for operating hours is not found. Nor is one
necessary, since market pressures and human appetites are sufficient to insure the Rio
Grande Cafe will be open when people usually eat lunch and dinner, and there is no
question that the Cafe has always been open at such times.
It is worth mentioning the effect of § 17A-2-1523, Utah Code. This statute, enacted
after the Interwest Aviation opinion, specifically exempts from the privilege tax "any [airport
authority] property leased, rented or granted by way of a concession . . . " (emphasis added).
§ 17A-2-1523 does not create new exemptions, it simply stands as the Legislature's
affirmation of the exemptions available to concessionaires and their "relative[s]" under § 594-101(3)(a). This view of § 17A-2-1523 requires no contortions, since similar statutes must
be construed in harmony and to avoid conflicts. See, e.g. Div. of Unclaimed Property v.
McKay Dee Credit Union, 958 P.2d 234, 238 (Utah 1998), and De Baritault v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 913 P.2d 743, 747 (Utah 1996). See also, Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah
1984) ("a law must apply equally to all persons of a class") (citing State Tax Commission v.
Dept. of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1978)).

-8-

Finally, the County urges an interpretation of the privilege tax exemption that reads
the phrase "or relative to" right out of § 57-4-101(3)(a). If the Cafe's lease with the state and
exclusive use of the north wing of the Depot is not a concession under the County's
Michigan-flavored interpretation, it is most certainly is "relative to, the use of a public
airport, park, fairground, or similar property."
II.
THE "ESCAPED PROPERTY"
PROVISIONS D O N O T APPLY.
The County attempts to invoke the"escaped property" provisions found in § 59-2-3C9,
Utah Code (1995 amendment) 5 of the Property Tax Act (§ 59-2-101, et. seq.,) in order to
collect five previous years' worth of a non-property tax imposed in a separate statute. By
doing so, the County confuses apples and oranges and ignores the fundamental distinctions
between a property tax and a privilege tax.
A property tax is a tax assessed against the physical property 6 itself (e.g., § 59-2-301),
creating a lien on real property (§ 59-2-1325), which lien is enforced by the sale of the
property itself (§ 59-2-1353). On the other hand the privilege tax is a tax "imposed on the
possession or other beneficial use'' of exempt property (§ 59-4-101(l)(a), emphasis added),

5

The 1995 version of the Code is cited, because although the escaped property definition has not materially
changed, there were subsequent additions to the definitions that may be material here
6

§ 59-2-102(19), Utah Code ('95 amendment), defined "property," which specifically did not include certain
items and "other intangibles " The Property Tax Act was subsequently amended to mclude a separate
definition for "intangible property" (§ 59-2-102(17), Utah Code (2002 amendment)), which definition provides
an inclusive, not exclusive, list This list of items is not identical to the '95 listed items

-9-
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The threshold determination to be made by the Court is the meaning of the

term "concession" as that term is used in the privilege tax statute.
2.

This Court is obligated to apply the ordinary and accepted meaning of the

language of the statute. The Court cannot go beyond the plain and unambiguous language
of subparagraph (3) of the privilege tax exemptions statute.
3.

The Court concludes that the proper definition of the term "concession" is a

grant, by a government entity, of property to be put to a particular use. Accordingly, the
various affidavits submitted by the parties are unnecessary for the Court to determine
whether the lease at issue here constitutes a "concession" under the privilege tax exemption
statute. The Court makes no determination as to the admissibility or persuasiveness of such
affidavits since they did not raise factual issues that influence or change the plain meaning
of the term "concession."
4.

The Cafe's lease with the State constitutes a concession since the use of the

exempt property in the Depot by the Cafe was for a particular purpose, i.e., a restaurant.
As the restaurant was also open and available to the general public as per the lease, and as
the Depot, which contains the museum and train station, is public property similar to a
public airport, park, or fairground, the Cafe therefore meets the requirements of § 59-4101(3)(a), Utah Code, and is exempt from the imposition of the privilege tax.

-5-

; to

the Board's motion for summary judgment.

It says on Page 3

that while the plain statute—the plain language of the
3

statute does support the theory of the case espoused by the

4

Rio, such an interpretation defeats the purpose behind the

5

privilege tax statute.
And they're asking this Court here to defeat the

6
7

literal wording and impose what they believe is the intent of

8

the Legislature.

9

go beyond the statute when a statute is clear on its face.

Well, I don't believe that I have a right to

10

The interpretation of the statute is clear and the directions

11

given by the Supreme Court to judges in this State says that

12

when the statute is clear and unambiguous, it's to be

13

enforced.

14

It's certainly not ambiguous in this case.

I'm not to look behind unless it is ambiguous.

15

The State said in its contract, it owns a facility

16

and it is desirous of having a restaurant-cafeteria operated

17

at said location for the convenience of employees, visitors

18

and general public of the State.
Under any interpretation, that is a grant—a grant

19
20

of a concession in the eyes of this Court and therefore,

21

summary judgment in this matter will be granted to the Rio

22

Grande in this case finding that it is a concessionaire and

23

therefore exempt from the tax sought to be imposed by the

24

County.

25

Mr. Call, I want you to draft a proper order in this

27

ADDENDUM G
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103(21)(a)(1995)

UTAH CODE
UNANNOTATED
1995
VOLUME 3
Complete through the
1995 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION

MICHIE BUTTERWORTH
Law Publishers
Charlottesville, Virginia

59-2-103

REVENUE AND TAXATION

(18) "Personal property" includes:
(a) every class of property as denned in Subsection
(19) which is the subject of ownership and not included within the meaning of the terms "real estate"
and "improvements";
(b) gas and water mains and pipes laid in roads,
streets, or alleys;
(c) bridges and ferries; and
(d) livestock which, for the purposes of the exemption provided under Section 59-2-1112, means all
domestic animals, honeybees, poultry, fur-bearing
animals, and fish.
(19) "Property" means property which is subject to
assessment and taxation according to its value, but does
not include moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, representative
property, franchises, goodwill, copyrights, patents, or
other intangibles.
(20) "Public utility," for purposes of this chapter, means
the operating property of a railroad, common carrier, gas
corporation, oil or gas transportation or pipeline company,
coal slurry pipeline company, electrical corporation, telephone corporation, sewerage corporation, or heat corporation where the company performs the service for, or
delivers the commodity to, the public generally or companies serving the public generally, or in the case of a gas
corporation or an electrical corporation, where the gas or
electricity is sold or furnished to any member or consumers within the state for domestic, commercial, or industrial use. Public utility also means the operating property
of any entity or person defined under Section 54-2-1
except warehousemen and water corporations.
(21) "Real estate or property" includes:
(a) the possession of, claim to, ownership of, or
right to the possession of land;
(b) all mines, minerals, and quarries in and under
the land, all timber belonging to individuals or corporations growing or being on the lands of this state
or the United States, and all rights and privileges
appertaining to these; and
(c) improvements.
(22) "Residential property," for the purposes of the
reductions and adjustments under this chapter, means
any property used for residential purposes as a primary
residence. It does not include property used for transient
residential use or condominiums used in rental pools.
(23) "Taxable value" means fair market value less any
applicable reduction allowed for residential property under Section 59-2-103.
(24) "Taxing entity" means any county, city, town,
school district, special taxing district, or any other political subdivision of the state with the authority to levy a tax
on property.
(25) "Tax roll" means a permanent record of the taxes
charged on property, as extended on the assessment roll
and may be maintained on the same record or records as
the assessment roll or may be maintained on a separate
record properly indexed to the assessment roll. It includes
tax books, tax lists, and other similar materials.
1995
59-2-103.

R a t e of a s s e s s m e n t of p r o p e r t y — Residential

property.
(1) All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and
taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the basis of its fanmarket value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise
provided by law.
(2) Beginning January 1, 1995, the fair market value of
residential property shall be reduced by 45%, representing a
residential exemption allowed under Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 2, Utah Constitution.

(3) No more than one acre of land per residential uniJ
qualify for the residential exemption.
59-2-104. S i t u s of p r o p e r t y for tax p u r p o s e s .
(1) The situs of all taxable property is the tax area wKja
is located.
^
(2) Personal property, unless assessed by the co] _ ^ ^
shall be assessed in the tax area where the owner is domfrj
in this state on January 1, unless the owner demonstrate
the satisfaction of the county assessor that the penS
property is usually kept in a tax area other than that tJJ
domicile of the owner, in which case that property "
assessed in the other tax area.
\u
(3) Land shall be assessed in parcels or subdivisions!
exceeding 640 acres each, and tracts of land containing
than 640 acres, which have been sectioned by the ~
States government, shall be assessed by sections or
of sections.
(4) The following property shall be listed and asi
the county where the property is located:
(a) public utilities, when operated wholly in i
county;
1
(b) bridges and ferries which are not public uulitj
when operated wholly in one county;
1
(c) electric light lines and similar improvements; a
(d) canals, ditches, and flumes when separately fa

able.

J

59-2-105. Situs of public utilities, bridges, ferries,
canals.
Public utilities, and bridges and ferries not public utiKtil
when operated wholly in one county, and electric light Ha
and similar improvements, canals, ditches, andflumeswbj
separately taxable, shall be listed and assessed in the couaj
in which the property is located.
59-2-106. Repealed.
PART 2
ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY
59-2-201. Assessment by commission — Determinati
of value of mining property — Notification j
assessment — Local assessment of prop
assessed by the unitary method.
(1) By May 1 of each year the following property,
otherwise exempt under the Utah Constitution or under 1
11 of this chapter, shall be assessed by the commission]
100% of fair market value, as valued on January 1, •
accordance with this chapter:
(a) all property which operates as a unit across con
lines, if the values must be apportioned among moret
one county or state;
(b) all property of public utilities;
(c) all operating property of an airline, air
service, and air contract service;
(d) all geothermal fluids and geothermal resources; I
(e) all mines and mining claims except in cases,
determined by the commission, where the mining c%
are used for other than mining purposes, in which cij
the value of mining claims used for other than minn
purposes shall be assessed by the assessor of the county!
which the mining claims are located; and
%
(f) all machinery used in mining, all property or rt
face improvements upon or appurtenant to mines i
mining claims. For the purposes of assessment and ta*
tion, all processing plants, mills, reduction w o r ^ f l , J?
smelters which are primarily used by the owner of axnp
or mining claim for processing, reducing, or smeltil
minerals taken from a mine or mining claim shall I

